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Introduction
Governance, at both the global and national levels, has long been an impor-
tant focus of international development efforts. However, while there is a 
long history of global goal setting, there has been very little goal setting on 
national governance and institutions. Global governance was incorporated 
into the MDGs as Goal 8 (Develop a global partnership for development), but 
there was no domestic governance goal. The proposed inclusion of Goal 16 
in the SDGs (Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable devel-
opment, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels) by the Open Working Group for Sustainable 
Development Goals (2014) is therefore genuinely novel and important. In this 
chapter we take a step back to try and clear up some conceptual confusion 
around the status of governance in international goal setting, as well as flag 
up the likely political challenges facing the SDGs. We evaluate the historical 
process of governance goal setting, progress in the area, and finally assess the 
current debates and propose the most important issues facing the future of 
governance and development goals.
Our starting point is a general definition of governance as ‘the institutions, 
mechanisms or processes backed by political power and/or authority that allow 
an activity or set of activities to be controlled, influenced or directed in the col-
lective interest’ (Baker, Hudson & Woodward 2005: 4). This definition includes 
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laws (hard and soft), regulations, and agreements; organisations (national, local 
and regional governments, international bodies, secretariats, NGOs, and busi-
nesses); shared norms of behaviour; and the balance of power therein. This defi-
nition allows us to make three key framing points that inform the rest of the 
chapter: domestic-global, goal-process, and management- politics.
First, a key distinction is the different, and often separate, debates around 
domestic and global governance. Second, it is important to be clear as to 
whether we are, and indeed should be referring to a governance goal, such as 
improving state capacity by x% or transparency by y%, or governance as the 
process by which other goals are achieved or delivered. Third, governance is 
often reduced to management; however, governance is really about politics, 
which is the collective social activity through which people make, preserve, and 
amend the rules that regulate the production, distribution, and use of resources 
(Heywood 2014; Lasswell 1936; Leftwich 2004). This means that governance is 
about much more than technical management, it is also fundamentally about 
power, interests, values, authority, and legitimacy. Governance not only con-
cerns the distribution of power and wealth, but it is also the process through 
which the current system is maintained or contested.
What is the historical process by which goal setting  
in this sector has developed?
Since the emergence of international development as an area of global policy 
following the Second World War, there has been much emphasis placed on 
governance at the global and national levels. At the global level, the emphasis 
has traditionally been on the transfer of finance and knowledge from richer 
to poorer nations, while the focus on national governance centred around the 
belief that democracy was fundamental to the development process (Hudson 
and Dasandi 2014).
The United Nations Millennium Declaration, from which the MDGs evolved, 
makes explicit reference to promoting democracy and strengthening the rule of 
law (UNGA 2000). The MDGs partnership between richer and poorer nations 
is based on a ‘compact’, in which richer nations commit themselves to meeting 
aid obligations, while poorer countries provide the ‘appropriate policy context 
for development’, including good governance, sound economic decision mak-
ing, transparency, accountability, rule of law, respect for human rights and civil 
liberties, and local participation (Greig et al. 2007; UNDP 2003). The question 
that arises, then, is why the MDGs themselves prioritised (an admittedly weak 
and non-binding) global governance goal while domestic governance goals 
were completely absent? We suggest three reasons.
First, United Nations member states (the donors in particular) were unable to 
agree on what a domestic governance goal should consist of (White and Black 
2004). In particular, this relates to democracy. While this has been a normative 
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principle of the donor countries, there has been a long debate on whether or not 
democracy is necessary for development, especially as a number of the most suc-
cessful developing countries, particularly the East Asian ‘tiger’ economies, and 
now Rwanda and Ethiopia, have been autocratic. This doubt, plus collective con-
cerns about sovereignty, helped trump any attempts to include a democracy goal.
Second, the MDGs were an explicit attempt to move away from the Wash-
ington Consensus and its associated aid conditionality where, to receive aid, 
and in particular emergency loans, developing countries had to implement a 
series of market-based policy reforms. The consensus was that this had been 
a failure (Chang 2003; Easterly 2001). Given this, there was a concerted effort 
to move from macroeconomic policy reform towards a results-based approach 
to human development goals (Greig et al. 2007; Wilkinson and Hulme 2012). 
Third, the MDGs were based on an understanding of poverty promoted by 
Jeffrey Sachs, the director of the Millennium Project. For Sachs, poverty is a 
function of past poverty and adverse geography, not primarily bad governance 
(Sachs 2005; Sachs et al. 2004; UNDP 2006). As such, the MDGs framework 
was based on the premise that developing countries required a large amount of 
aid to escape their ‘poverty trap’ (Hudson 2015). 
Hence, to move past macroeconomic aid conditionality, the international 
community moved away from emphasising domestic causes of poverty and 
instead focused on the global partnership. Yet since then, there has been grow-
ing attention given to the role of domestic political institutions as a primary 
obstacle to development. As such, there has been a shift away from focusing on 
global governance towards a greater focus on national governance. 
What progress has been achieved in this sector through  
the Millennium Development Goals and other processes?
The MDGs had a limited focus on governance and institutions. Primarily, gov-
ernance was conceived as the management of global cooperation and as the 
partnership between donors and partner countries. Yet MDG 8 was notable 
for its lack of quantified and time-bound targets (e.g. Target 8.A, Develop fur-
ther an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial 
system). It was characterised by somewhat oblique measures of a global part-
nership (e.g. Target 8.F, In cooperation with the private sector, make available 
the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications). 
The goal’s targets refer to donor aid commitments, duty-free imports, debt 
levels, and access to affordable drugs and internet penetration. But, as Clarke 
(2004) argues, the notion of ‘partnership’ in development has typically referred 
to aid. And this is a longstanding view, with donor aid targets dating as far back 
as the Pearson Commission (Hudson 2015; Pearson 1969).
Progress to date, as measured against the official MDG 8 indicators, has been 
mixed and moderate. Aid (Target 8.A), after falling in recent years, has picked 
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up again in 2013 to hit a record high of US$134.8 billion (UNDP 2014). Since 
1990, aid has increased by 56 per cent in absolute terms (at constant prices) 
(OECD 2014). However, in relative terms (as a proportion of donor budgets) it 
has fallen to from 0.32 per cent in 1990 to 0.3 per cent in 2013. Meanwhile non-
DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donors are increasing their budg-
ets, for example the United Arab Emirates gave 1.25 per cent of their national 
income in aid. Also importantly, less aid is going to the poorest countries and 
more is going to middle-income countries. While this reflects the changing 
geography of poverty (Sumner 2010), it adversely impacts on Targets 8.B and 
8.C, which are to address the special needs of the least developed, landlocked 
developing countries and small-island developing States.
Duty-free market access has improved for developing countries, as the pro-
portion of developed country imports has increased from 54 per cent in 1996 
to 80 per cent of their exports in 2012 (UNDP 2014). However, market pro-
tection, especially by Japan, the US, and the EU, continues to protect cloth-
ing textiles and agricultural products (all key exports for many developing 
countries), so the question of precisely which goods and services lie within this 
20 per cent matters a great deal. Furthermore, the advantage that the LDCs 
have had over other developing countries is being steadily eroded as average 
tariff levels have fallen.
Debt levels have fallen in recent years (Target 8.D), with the average debt bur-
den of developing countries standing at 3.1 per cent in 2012 (as a proportion of 
foreign debt service to exports revenue); it was 12 per cent in 2000. However, 
seasoned observers are flagging up a large increase of 75% in foreign loans to 
low-income countries, and a doubling of loans to sub-Saharan African coun-
tries between 2008 and 2012 (Jones 2014). The increasingly widespread use of 
mobile-cellular and information technologies has been well documented. The 
latest figures report that, by the end of 2014, 40 per cent of the world will be 
using the internet and there will be seven billion mobile phone subscriptions 
(with many people holding multiple accounts) (UNDP 2014).
Beyond the MDGs, other processes have fed into or can be used to track pro-
gress on governance. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and 
the resulting Accra Agenda for Action (OECD 2008) identified a set of prin-
ciples to improve the quality of donor aid by strengthening, harmonising, and 
aligning developing country governance structures and processes with inter-
national aid systems. Similar to the MDGs, the Declaration was built around 
a set of indicators and targets that were to be met by 2010 (OECD 2008). The 
2011 final report on progress was a ‘sobering’ read (OECD 2011): only one of the 
13 targets had been met by 2010. 
Finally, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) are used by the World 
Bank to track six dimensions of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 
2010). They cover the following dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Politi-
cal Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The time series data shows 
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a relatively static picture since 1996, with the global averages showing no clear 
pattern of systematic improvements or declines (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastru-
zzi 2010). However, the authors note that at an individual country level, over 
one time period such as a decade, around eight per cent of countries will typi-
cally show a significant improvement or decline.
Meanwhile, in academic debates, there has been huge progress in under-
standing the role of domestic political institutions in development. While the 
original work was spearheaded by Douglass North (1991), the most influential 
work has been Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2001, 
2002) whose use of historic data and new econometric techniques enabled 
them to make strong causal claims about the role of institutions in develop-
ment. It is worth noting that these causal claims were made by directly com-
paring the impact of political institutions with Sachs’ claims about geography. 
The findings led to something of a consensus among prominent development 
researchers that ‘institutions rule’ (Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi 2004). It is 
this new perspective that has led to the inclusion of a national governance goal 
in the proposed goals put forward by the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons 
on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. 
What is the current debate about future goal setting?
As noted, the major debate around the SDGs with respect to governance is 
whether and how to include a domestic governance goal (e.g. Bates-Eamer et al. 
2012; Foresti & Wild 2014; Transparency International 2010, 2013). Specific 
governance targets being proposed include rule of law, budget and procure-
ment integrity and transparency, citizen engagement, corruption and bribery, 
service delivery effectiveness, civil liberties, freedom of the press, access to jus-
tice, gender rights, property rights, breadth of the tax base, and so forth. The 
more interesting aspect of this debate is whether to have a stand-alone set of 
governance targets versus governance targets within each goal; for example a 
governance target for maternal health, a governance target for the environment, 
and so forth. Or, as Marta Foresti (2014:1) has persuasively argued, ‘focusing all 
efforts on a ‘stand-alone’ goal risks missing the point. All eggs are being placed 
in one basket rather than in a wider strategy to put governance on the global 
agenda for the next 15 years.’ Our argument builds on this and suggests that 
the real issues around governance and sustainable development lie ‘above’ and 
‘below’ the level of national institutions.
Coordinating action across multiple SDGs raises very serious challenges in 
terms of regime fragmentation, as well as the particular problem structures 
and strategic environments distinct issue areas reveal. For example, the pros-
pects for strengthening the implementation of the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (proposed Goal 3.a) presents a 
very different problem structure in terms of existing cross-sectoral capabilities 
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and interest-alignment and implementation mechanisms, compared to halving 
global food waste and reducing food losses along production and supply chains 
(proposed Goal 12.3). Other SDGs, such as assisting developing countries in 
attaining long-term debt sustainability (proposed Goal 17.4), may conflict with 
the financial rules of international financial institutions like the International 
Monetary Foundation (Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sus-
tainable Development Goals 2014). 
There is a double risk: on the one hand retreat into silo particularisms and 
policy prescriptions which do not account for the cross-cutting nature of many 
of the goals or, equally problematic, an overambitious governance frame which 
identifies all of these issues as facets of the same problem, but offers little in the 
way of concrete solutions. The solution is not just to look for win-wins, but to 
cluster linked SDGs whose solution is likely to hinge on understanding and 
ameliorating negative interactions (for instance, assuring all people have access 
to adequate, affordable, safe and nutritious food and phasing out all forms of 
agricultural support subsidies).
First, ‘below’. It is now increasingly accepted that politics is central to explain-
ing development outcomes (Carothers and de Gramont 2013; DFID 2010; Left-
wich 2000, 2005; Wild & Foresti 2011). Effectively and successfully govern-
ing and managing the interactions between different sectors and development 
goals is always inherently a political question. It is always possible to identify 
governance gaps and to design suitable and necessary institutional arrange-
ments to fill these gaps. However, the subsequent questions of whether or not 
these institutions are put in place, receive the necessary resources and support 
to operate, and can effectively implement their objectives boils down to the 
question of ‘political will’. Anyone interested in the success of the goals will 
need to engage in some serious political analysis (Fritz et al. 2014; Hudson and 
Leftwich 2014; IDS 2010; Unsworth & Williams 2011; UNDP 2012; Wild & 
Foresti 2011). 
Second, ‘above’. Effective implementation clearly depends upon domestic 
configurations of institutions and political will. However, there is no getting 
away from the supra-national aspect of governance for sustainable develop-
ment, given the irreducibly global nature of the challenge. Many developmental 
issues, from forest stewardship, to soil fertility, desertification, and air pollu-
tion, can only be addressed at the global level, given their transboundary char-
acter. In addition, issues conventionally perceived as domestic (read sovereign), 
such as poverty eradication, non-communicable disease control, health system 
reform, and educational provision, may also have a crucial global dimension. 
This is especially true as the policy space for delivering public goods is increas-
ingly circumscribed by prescriptive economic models and expansive transna-
tional trade regulation. 
The sustainable development agenda demands coordinated action at the 
global level. Institutions are required to limit the negative externalities of 
decentralised action, to provide focal points for coordinated action, to deal 
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with systemic disruptions in a global context of growing interdependence and 
complexity, and provide some form of safeguard against severe deprivation 
and hardship (Keohane 2001). Sustainability and development deal with issues 
that do not conform to established political boundaries and require manage-
ment and steering at multiple levels of authority. Scholars and practitioners 
have acknowledged the challenge of approaching questions of global govern-
ance in a coherent fashion (Thakur 2009). Further, in a context where power is 
distributed across diverse societal subsystems and among many societal actors 
the challenge of managing transformative change is increased (Meadowcroft 
2014: 300). We illustrate these issues through a discussion of the governance of 
sustainable development, as well as drawing out lessons on the importance of 
institutional stewardship in a context of complex and competing goals (such as 
we have with the SDGs).
Global governance of sustainable development has a long history of goal set-
ting, initiated with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
held in Stockholm in 1972 and the establishment of the UNEP. However, it is 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 that defined the global agenda. The UNCED 
established the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), a United 
Nations entity mandated to monitor and review progress on globally agreed 
goals and targets. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development pro-
vides an exhaustive ‘blueprint’ for implementation of sustainable development, 
containing 27 principles on development and the environment. Alongside this, 
the 300-page Agenda 21 document sets out international and national objec-
tives, and provides programmatic suggestions on how to fulfil those objectives, 
with more than 1,000 specific policy recommendations across four principal 
domains: social and economic dimensions, conservation and management of 
resources for development, strengthening the role of major groups, and means 
of implementation (UNEP Agenda 21).7 The UNCED also produced a series of 
important global governance mechanisms including new multilateral environ-
mental conventions (the UNFCCC).
Nevertheless, the Rio Conventions inaugurated what has been described as 
a ‘golden age’ in international norm-setting (Pattberg &Widerberg 2015, in 
press). The 1990s saw a series of significant advances in sustainable development 
regulatory frameworks, including the creation of the United Nations Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Forests, the Kyoto Protocol, the Global  Programme of 
Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activi-
ties, and the United Nations guidelines on sustainable consumption. However, 
observers have noted that since 2000, there has appeared to be a ‘stagnation’ 
in international law (Pauwelyn, Wessel & Wouters 2012). On the other hand, 
we have witnessed the rapid growth of specialised and relatively autonomous 
 7 Agenda 21 has been reaffirmed and modified at subsequent United Nations meetings. 
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rule or rule-complexes, often driven by private institutions and transnational 
networks. 
The impact of global frameworks on sustainable development has been 
underwhelming, with Agenda 21 criticised as having ‘failed to serve as a useful 
guide to action’ (Thakur 2009). Since 2003, the CSD has served as the United 
Nations’ hub for coordination on sustainable development, but is widely 
regarded as ineffective, buried in delegation chains of bureaucracy within 
the United Nations, and lacking implementation prerogatives or a financing 
mechanism (Cruickshank, Schneeberger & Smith 2012). For many observ-
ers, the global machinery underpinning a sustainable development agenda is 
not fit for purpose. Global structures and enhancing interagency coordination 
has been on the agenda since the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002. Against a backdrop of accelerating unsus-
tainable development, reform in global structures has struggled to keep pace 
(IPCC 2013).
In terms of institutional stewardship, Agenda 21 asserted the role of UNEP 
as the leading global environmental authority and produced a series of rec-
ommendations in order to strengthen its governance function. This was duly 
recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2012. How-
ever, concerns persist over the goodness of fit of the UNEP mandate and sus-
tainable development, which includes environment, but also goes beyond to 
engage issues of resource management and social and economic dimensions. 
Figure 1 provides some initial insight into the sustainable development regime 
complex within the United Nations system. There is no coordinating mecha-
nism within the system dedicated to managing the sustainable development 
complex. This governance arrangement has exacerbated difficulties in prior-
itisation of sustainable development objectives, leading to a silo as opposed to 
an integrated approach towards the three core pillars of Agenda 21: economic, 
social, and environmental. Post-Rio+20, UNEP has been elevated to the status 
of a United Nations programme. However, its jurisdiction is principally con-
fined to environmental protection, has no authority to enforce environmental 
regulation, and suffers from chronic underfunding. The 2012 reform elevated 
UNEP’s relationship with the General Assembly, however, it remains a sub-
sidiary programme as opposed to a more robust and autonomous specialised 
agency such as the WHO. Although a proposal to upgrade UNEP to a spe-
cialised agency was tabled at Rio+20, as well as the possibility of superseding 
it with a United Nations environmental organisation, neither idea prospered. 
The natural coordinating mechanism within the system of the United Nations 
might be the CSD. However, its impact is widely regarded as underwhelming: it 
suffers from low-grade status as a functional commission to the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), has no implementation or financing 
apparatus, and has little strategic impact on national or international policy 
making (Cruickshank, Schneeberger & Smith 2012).
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This figure is not exhaustive, but illustrates some of the main agencies and institu-
tions in the global sustainable development regime complex where substantial rule-
making efforts have occurred. This complex is focused on the United Nations human 
rights system, and does not include multilateral, bilateral, or private rule-making 
domains. * Specialised agency, ** GA/ECOSOC fund/programme, *** Functional 
commission.
Key: CSD: Commission on Sustainable Development; FAO: Food and Agriculture 
Organization; ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; ICESCR: 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; IFAD: International 
Fund For Agricultural Development; IMF: International Monetary Fund; IMO: Inter-
national Maritime Organization; ITC: International Trade Centre; OHCHR: Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; UNAIDS: Joint United Nations Pro-
gramme on HIV/AIDS; UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment; UNDP: United Nations Development Programme; UNEP: United Nations 
Environmental Programme; UN-HABITAT: United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme; UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund; UNIDO: United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization; WFP: World Food Programme; WHO: World 
Health Organization; WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization; WTO: World 
Trade Organization.
So, given this, how best to design effective delivery of the SDGs? Much of 
the governance literature has sought to enhance the effectiveness of govern-
ance arrangements through effective management of participating states and 
other actors. Reliance on market mechanisms, materials incentives, and sanc-
tions to reduce transaction costs and secure credible commitments remains a 
powerful influence on the governance debate today. Scholarship on multilevel 
Figure 1: The Sustainable Development Regime Complex.
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governance emphasises efficiency gains through coordination, and functional 
and stratificatory differentiation across regimes (Zürn & Faude 2013). Put sim-
ply, a fragmented regime complex, as displayed in Figure 1, can be efficient 
where there is clear division of labour, specialisation, and role differentiation 
among institutions operating at different levels of governance (Biermann et al. 
2009). However, the necessary condition for effective governance is effective 
regime management. Without regime cohesion and rule-system stewardship, 
the whole is unlikely to be greater than the sum of its parts. Indeed, we now 
understand all too well the obstacles to cooperation and enforcement when 
faced with asymmetric negative externalities (Mitchell & Keilbach 2001). 
In turn, such governance frameworks privilege interests and underappre-
ciate the role of power, values, and history in determining the preferences of 
member states when confronted with the benefits and trade-offs of cooperating 
on sustainable development. As observed in the collapse of global trade nego-
tiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the usual mechanisms of 
interstate bargaining, such as reciprocity, have been no match for powerful his-
torical grievances amid the rise of the G20 emerging economies (Young 2007). 
Pascal Lamy, the former Director-General of the WTO, has called for a new 
‘Geneva Consensus’ in international trade negotiation: one which is sensitive 
to both global and local social, economic, and political contexts (Lamy 2013). 
Guided by the concept of subsidiarity (decisions should be made at as local a 
level as possible), others have employed a polycentric bottom-up governance 
approach (Abbott 2012).
To conclude, the SDGs agenda demands an evaluation of the acceptable 
bounds of natural, human, and human-produced capital if the biosphere and 
ecosystem is to be preserved. It is also an opportunity to urgently take stock of 
the governance actors and structures currently dedicated to the task of acceler-
ating change at all levels of human activity, including perhaps the most impor-
tant of the proposed SDGs: transformation of consumption and production 
patterns. A lot of faith continues to be placed in a market-based approach to 
sustainable development. However, it is incumbent upon sustainable devel-
opment policy architects to acknowledge the fundamental limitations of the 
market to provide public goods. SDGs governance architecture is not simply 
a realm of harmonising interests in pursuit of coordination, it also requires a 
serious engagement with politics and power. The key factors here are political 
action by public authorities at all levels, the capacity to build broad-based and 
plural coalitions of support, and the deployment of a range of principled instru-
ments, including legal instruments, to ensure sustainable development.
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